at the site of development efforts. However, post-development has shortcomings.
Commentators such as Stuart Corbridge (1998) David Lehman (1997) , and Nederveen Pieterse (2000) are correct to lament the facile oppositional rhetoric of some (often the most visible) post-development writers and a certain lack of scholarship by some contributors. One manifestation of the latter is post-development's limited use of its self-identified theoretical resources, the most prominent of which, at least to date, is Michel Foucault. Lehman (1997) argues that Arturo "use" of Foucault is limited to 'a particular sort of style and a sprinkling of the name of Michel Foucault and quotations from his work'. Another prominent post-development publication, The Development Dictionary (Sachs 1992a ), alludes to Foucault and his well-known work on power with a subtitle of A guide to knowledge as power but does not follow this up. The Dictionary is characterized more by a decrying of the Eurocentrism and injustice of development than a Foucaultian or other analysis of the operation of power through development. This paper offers a closer engagement with Foucualt's conceptualization of power as one way of advancing postdevelopment. As Foucault's work has inspired much post-development writing, this is an obvious starting point albeit one which deserves to be complemented with engagements with Indigenous knowledges and other scholarship.
In this article, I first show that Foucault's distinction between sovereign and bio-power suggests a similar distinction between the colonial and development eras. This requires a shift away from a negative or repressive view of the operation of power through development, and from notions, often present in post-development, that a singular or intentional historical force directs power. Instead, I argue for the relevance of Foucault's relational conceptualization of power and recognition that development is synthetically bound with biopower which operates by bringing forth and promoting rather than repressing the forces and energies of human subjects. Such an approach also entails reconfiguring the oppositional stance taken by many post-development writers. I next suggest combining demonstrate that taking the post-development critical impulse seriously requires moving away from the colonization metaphor through a closer understanding of the operation of power through development, including its productive modality.
Colonialism to Development: from a deductive to productive modality of power
In his study of the emergence of a new modality of power in European societies, Foucault draws a heuristic distinction between sovereign power and a new form of power which he terms biopower. The former, which is associated with the reign of the King or monarch (and in our time with the judiciary and the rule of law), operates by 'deduction', by taking away 3 and appropriation, by 'seizure: of things, time, bodies and ultimately life itself ' (1981: 136) .
This accounts for the destruction of bodies in the name of the sovereign, an example of which is provided in the recounting of a 1757 gruesome torture in the opening pages of Foucault's Discipline and Punish (1979: 3-6) . The centrality of the figure of the monarch signals the appropriateness of this conceptualization to the operation of power through colonialism. Colonies were taken in the name of the monarch and colonial rule was characterized by a sense of ownership, sovereignty, or rule over stemming directly from conquest. Colonial rule included forced labour, the imposition of cash crops, the extraction of taxes and profits, and a range of abuses associated with the position of power and cultural superiority European colonialists felt they held 2 . In this sense, colonial power was exercised primarily through deduction, through the right to extract a portion of wealth, labour, goods and services. This culminated in the notion of 'seiz…[ing] hold of life in order to suppress it' (Foucault 1981: 136) because the use or threat of force was central to quelling uprisings and maintaining colonized-colonizer power relations.
In contrast, Foucault shows that biopower, which infiltrates and operates alongside sovereign power as it becomes more dominant in modern Europe, sets itself a very different task.
Through a multitude of procedures and mechanisms, it fosters, organises, incites and optimises life; by drawing upon mutually supporting procedures of power and knowledge, it simultaneously redefines and administers life in order to manage it in a calculated way. The rise of the modern humanism and the social sciences play an important role here. Biopower does not operate in accordance with the symbol of the sword -the symbol of the sovereignand the right to 'take life or let live' (Foucault 1981: 136) . Rather, it is a 'a way of acting 4 upon an acting subject or subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action' (Foucault 1982: 220) . Moreover, biopower is a 'power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them' (Foucault 1981: 136) . The developmentalist characteristics of biopower, in the sense of bringing out forces, making them grow and so on, are immediately apparent. It is these qualities which facilitate early European development through the disciplining of human subjects in early industry and capitalism (Foucault 1981: 141) .
This contrast between the dominant operation of sovereign power in Europe's colonies and the emerging European operation of biopower means that the latter productive modality is unable to emerge in a comprehensive sense in the colonies 3 . However, the period of the interwar years sees a major change in the strategic situation of the colonies (later to become the "Third World"). This change meant that the option of using force or other restrictive measures to quash unrest could no longer be taken up. Instead, colonial officials, along with anti-colonial nationalist leaders, began to promote the welfare and benefit of the colonies. In this period, the possibility emerges for the operation of a different modality of power in relation to the decolonizing countries -one which relies not predominantly on force, but on the mobilisation (including self-mobilisation) of human subjects and nation-states through the notion of development. As this possibility is progressively realized (as nation-states form out of ex-colonies, join the United Nations, prepare national development plans, and so on) the relevance of oppositional formulations diminish.
However, it is oppositional and colonialist formulations, indicative of a broader oppositional stance, which have recently been recuperated by some post-development writers in order to make a forceful point about what they see as the operation of Western hegemony through development. Majid Rahnema (1992: 124) writes of colonizing of the mind, Arturo Escobar speaks of the 'colonizing mechanisms of development ' (1992: 142) and the colonization of reality (1995: 5) , Gustavo Esteva (1992: 11) refers to Latin American dependency theory as 'colonizing anti-colonialism' for its role in naturalising the concepts of "development" and "underdevelopment", and Claude Alvares (1992b: 229-230) says that development based on modern science constitutes an 'actively colonizing' power. Such comments form part of a broader position which tends to equate development with the Westernisation of the world (Sachs 1992b: 4; Latouche 1996) . Both the rhetorical efficacy and accuracy of these claims is severely undermined because development operates through the mobilisation of interests and aspirations of Third World subjects and nation-states which contrasts with the deductive modality of colonial power. Post-development use of the colonization metaphor either tends to ignore or sit awkwardly with this distinction, and with the fact that development represented a liberating possibility in the early postwar period for many Third World nationalists (Cooper 1997: 64; Cooper and Packard 1997a: 9) .
A closely related problem is the maintenance of the notion that power operates through a singular intentional historical force such as "the West". Gustavo Esteva (1992: 6) that what we most readily recognise as "power" is the more or less stable (yet continually renegotiated) coagulation or ossification of sets of relations -or lines of force, in Deleuze's (1988; terminology. Power is, in other words, a complex strategic situation (Foucault 1981: 93) . The rhetorical strategies deployed by Esteva and others ossify force relations in development discourse in ways that have implications for the relative agency of actors within the development project. The most striking instance of this is the ascription of agency to the West through viewing the notion of development as a Western imposition or hegemony (e.g. see Sachs 1992b: 4-5) . This elides the fact that many Third World governments and subjects have actively embraced development, and has negative albeit unintended implications for resistance by Third World people. For instance, the intention of statements that 'The mental space in which people dream and act is largely occupied by Western imagery' and 'the "Other" has vanished with development' (Sachs 1992b: 2) are clearly to critique the hegemony of development. However, one of their effects is to writes the "Others" -Third
World people -out of history in a similar way to discourses that are more commonly targeted as Eurocentric. Once again the oppositional and negative conceptualization of power fails us.
Viewing power solely as imposition leaves us, as Foucault states, with 'the insubstantiality of the notion of the master, an empty form haunted only by the various phantoms of the master and his slave, the master and his disciple' (Foucault 1980b: 139) .
Remedying this anachronistic sovereign conceptualisation of power requires a closer engagement with Foucault. In introducing a productive understanding of the operation of power in Europe, Foucault emphasises at least two aspects. The first of these is the emergence of techniques and practices, emerging most forcefully in factories, to increase utility of human subjects by increasing 'aptitudes, speeds, output and therefore profits ' (1979: 210) . In other terms, a series of techniques emerged to discipline bodies in ways which make them more productive. The second aspect, which is interwoven with the first, refers to the production of souls and regimes of truth; to the role that power has in producing individual identities and systems determining what can count as true or false (1979: 29) . This emphasis on productive force is not to suggest that power is never repressive in its effect. In
Foucault's schema, repression and domination represent extreme versions and limiting cases 8 of the operation of power -they involve a fixing of power relations in 'a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical' (Foucault 1987: 12) . Furthermore, sovereign power and biopower are not mutually exclusive, although Foucault's focus was on the latter rather than on the interplay between these two modalities of power 4 .
Foucault introduces these insights primarily to sharpen his (and our) understandings of the operation of contemporary relations of power. Normative judgments about whether or not the operation of power is "good" or "bad" are not his concern. Power effects may be judged as negative or positive but these do not automatically flow from Foucault's understanding. In fact, Foucault shows that generalised negative judgment through conventional liberal notions of "power" and "freedom" actually obscures the operation of power. As long as it remains possible to juxtapose these terms thereby locating power in certain spheres (the law, the state and so on), a wide domain of social practice can be imagined to be outside or beyond the operation of power. In contrast, one of Foucault's major insights has been to show that power relations (subjects acting upon themselves and others) are not an aberration but a ubiquity in social life. As the normative effects of the operation of power are not the focus of Nor should the productive analytics of power be confused with -and thereby reduced to -the more specific and widely known Foucaultian insight that while failing on their own terms, dispositifs or apparatuses 6 can have effects which serve other purposes (see Foucault 1979) .
James Ferguson (1990: 254-256 ) draws on this insight by arguing that while development projects may fail in terms of their stated aims, they are accompanied by a growth in the operation of power. Linking power with the failure of development in this way builds an association between the operation of power and the failure of development (and introduces conspiratorial tone into Ferguson's analysis). More analytically tenable and critically efficacious is the recognition that in its very aims, development is bound with the contemporary modality of power that operates by bringing forth and promoting the forces and energies of human subjects.
Thus, there is a need to address some shortcomings of post-development by doing away with an anachronistic sovereign conceptualization of power and engaging more closely with Bank without lapsing into a sovereign or colonial conceptualization of power.
The Dispositif and Normalization
One of Foucault's most useful concepts for coming to terms with the operation of power through development is the dispositif, or concrete social apparatus (Deleuze 1992 : 159) 7 . The dispositif is both a 'thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble' of discursive and material elements -for example, 'discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic
propositions' and so on -and the 'system of relations ... established between these elements' (Foucault 1980c: 194) . This conceptualisation is appropriate to the development project because from the late 1940s a range of institutions, funding and resource flows, philosophical propositions about the possibilities and desirability of social change modelled on the West, the professional development practitioner, scientific efforts (the entire sub-branch of development economics), and government and non-government organisations dedicated to development all begin to emerge. Although elements do not have tight interdependent relations, and while the dispositif may generate contradictory effects, it also achieves an overall or dominant strategic function such as 'the assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome for an essentially mercantilist economy' in eighteenth century Europe (1980c: 195) . This conceptualization allows recognition of both the good intentions of agents and a wide range of both positive and negative outcomes generated through development while still providing a basis to understand an operation of power which has the effect of governing the Third World . That is, it does not aggregate the operation of power or allow default to the oppositional position that development is "bad".
The manner in which overall governing effects occur through a dispositif can be understood as a macro-level operation of the mechanism of "normalization". This mechanism:
… brings five quite distinct operations into play: it refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation and the principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the following overall rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or as an optimum towards which one must move. It measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value the abilities, the level, the "nature" of individuals. It introduces, through this value-giving measure, the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved.
Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference in relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal... (Foucault 1979: 182-183 ).
The most direct way to mobilize the concept of normalization for understanding the development project is to transpose "nation-state" for "individual" in Foucault's formulation.
This expanded application of Foucault's mechanism of normalization responds to the emergence of the productive modality of power in a very different historical juncture from that which saw its initial emergence in Europe. International institutional and discursive developments in the postwar period allow the emergence of a dispositif on a scale not seen before; a scale which allows the insertion and normalization of nation-states as component elements of an overall apparatus. While this operation of normalization diverges somewhat from Foucault's (1979: 177-184) focus on the normalization of individual subjects, it falls well within the horizon of his understanding of power because the focus on the normalization of the nation-state does not preclude but in fact relies upon the operation of normalization at a range of other levels and sites, including that of individual subjects.
This argument draws upon Foucault's analysis of the contemporary modality of government in which the individualizing operation of power is integrated with wider operations for the management of populations (Foucault 1991: 102) . While the nation-state can be located as central to the development dispositif, it is not possible to regard it as constitutive of power.
Although the various instruments and procedures of the development project refer themselves to the state, they cannot be reduced to it. This is because the state is simply not sufficiently omnipresent, omnipotent, or efficient to manage the intricacies and differential motivations of institutions and people which emerge at the site of development efforts and constitute the development dispositif. This accords with Foucault's (1991: 103) argument that it is the diffuse and micro techniques of power which support or give rise to the state. This is not to say that the state is unimportant. Rather, it is 'superstructural in relation to a ... whole series of multiple and indefinite power relations' which allow the state to secure its existence (Foucault 1980a: 122) . Thus in transposing nation-state for individual, I am not arguing that power is exercised by the state but rather through the state, which acts as a fulcrum for operations of power in the development dispositif. In other words, there is a continuity in both downward and upward directions between the operation of normalization recognizable at the level of the nation-state and more micro operations of biopower which permeate development efforts. Local development efforts give rise to the state and have the effect of 13 regulating and producing social action and Third World human subjects. At the same time, nation-states are the units through which power operates at the macro level of the dispositif.
Normalization then, may be congruent with an entire dispositif, or with particular operations of power which form part of the broader ensemble.
The five operations of normalization have not been substantially engaged by postdevelopment 8 . In the main, post-development has tended to draw upon the more evocative aspects of Foucault's work on normalization such as the definition of the "abnormal". A number of post-development observers have argued the President Harry Truman's inaugural speech defined this abnormality by designating the majority of the earth's population as "underdeveloped" (e.g. see Esteva 1992: 7) . While this production of underdevelopmentwhich probably occurred more pervasively through postwar social science than Truman's speech -is important for the operation of normalization, it is not its end-goal and nor should it be read as a variation on the colonial theme of exclusion. Normalization does not operate by excluding subjects or entities but by assiduously integrating them into the regime of power, by measuring gaps and by the 'art of distributions' (Foucault 1979: 141) . Rather than identifying a limited number of more or less desirable positionings within the whole, normalization aims to set up a continuous space of differentiation. It measures gaps and determines levels with the aim of distributing nation-states and human subjects in order to rank them in relation to the developed norm. Thus the identification of "underdevelopment" serves primarily to identify the need for development and thereby to include Europe's Others in the international developmentalist whole.
In other terms, normalization establishes a single social field and operates through a framework of formal equality. In fact, these characteristics of normalization also constitute the basis for its operation. A single social field is necessary to enable the relevance of a norm which embodies specific behaviours and characteristics. In the case of the postwar development dispositif, this norm is represented by those orientations and practices geared toward producing the sort of material wealth embodied in the United States. This norm is in turn necessary as a standard against which social action can be evaluated and regulated. At the same time, the delineated social field must be sufficiently inclusive to obviate the accusation of oppression, to assemble enough human subjects for a "useful" operation of power, and to allow subjects "freedom" in relation to the norm such that they take responsibility for regulation of their own actions. While these requirements may be established more easily in a traditional operation of normalization (for instance, one in which the social sciences study populations within the well established terrain internal to Western nation-states), the post-colonial international context is infused with the legacy of sovereignstyle colonial political relations. These relations are frequently cast in terms of binary oppositions such as "developed-underdeveloped", and they largely grounded in the logic of exclusion.
However, despite the persistence of various oppositions within the development dispositif 9 , the overall transformation to an inclusive framework was effected surprisingly quickly. By Although normalization is a complete mechanism in itself, it rarely operates in isolation from the technology of hierarchical observation and the technique of the examination 10 .
Hierarchical observation enables normalization by linking visibility and surveillance with the induction of the effects of power (1979: 170-171) . In elucidating this technology in the context of European penal reform, Foucault (1979: 171-172 ) discusses the emergence of an architecture whose aim was the surveillance of its inhabitants. The paradigmatic form, and Foucault's most well-known example of this architecture, is Jeremy Bentham's panopticon (1979: 195-228) . The panopticon serves to arrange inmates in space in relation to supervisors such that the possibility of them being observed is omnipresent. However, the inmates cannot be sure if they are being observed at any one time because the supervisor is hidden. This illustrates the impulse of the mechanism of hierarchical observation: it acts as a central point which 'would be both the source of light illuminating everything, and a locus of convergence for everything that must be known: a perfect eye that nothing would escape and a centre towards which all gazes would be turned ' (1979: 173) . Hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment come together in the examination. Here the normalizing gaze 'establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them ' (1979: 184) . It is here that "truth" is established. Individuals are inserted into systems of knowledge which judge their capacities, and which justify and require both outside In the development setting, the seemingly innocuous collection of data about the Third World, structured by developmentalist social science and pursued by nearly every agency engaged in development efforts from local government research operations to country-level studies commissioned by the UN, IMF, and World Bank, performs a similar function. This proliferation of writing and statistics renders the nation-states and human subjects of the Third World sufficiently visible that they may be distributed and evaluated against the norm of development. A wide range of disciplines and foci are relevant here, but the Gross National Product per capita measure, with its capacity to at once totalise the field through the compilation of tables thereby rendering nation-states and subjects visible while simultaneously finely differentiating them, is perhaps most exemplary of developmentalist power-knowledge 11 . How though, through such a conceptualization of power, can we understand the position of an organization such as the World Bank, one target of much recent and ongoing criticism in relation to its "power" and influence?
The World Bank in the Development Dispositif
There is no doubt that the World Bank is a lead development institution. It is the largest single lender to the Third World and it designs and oversees the projects that it funds. It also exerts a high level of influence over national economic and development policies and plans as well as other development lenders and agencies. In this situation, Kevin Danaher (1994: 2) writes that the Bank has 'steadily gained power' in a way that for 'many in the Third World, ... harkens back to colonial times'. Escobar states that the World Bank 'should be seen as an agent of economic and cultural imperialism at the service of a global elite ' (1995: 167) . Here an unsympathetic reading of Escobar 12 would see him as arguing that some form of oppressive and imperialistic power is being masterminded through the World Bank on behalf of a semi-conscious global elite. Again, oppositional formulations, the aggregation of the operation of power, and the ascription of intentionality and agency to a singular historical force all emerge. While the colonial analogy (including use of terms such as "imperialism")
is evocative and rhetorically powerful, it misses the way in which power operates through the Bank and within the development dispositif.
The operation of power through the Bank can be more appropriately analyzed through
Foucault's notion of the panopticon (1979: 200-208) 13 . Foucault (1979) presents the panopticon not only as a localised and specific disciplinary technology which allows the supervision of inmates, but also as a 'generalizable model of functioning' and 'the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form ' (1979: 205) . It is 'a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use ' (1979: 205) . The distribution of individuals or groups in relation to one another, a focus on the surveillance or visibility of the objects of power, and the hierarchized observation or study of the targets of the operation of power are key elements which recur across a wide range of contexts and settings including the international development dispositif. In the case of the Bank, an operation of power occurs through its role as a leader and trainer, and its influence on other institutions and agencies. Central to the operation of panopticism as a political technology is the control of visibility: the limitation of inward vision alongside the intensification of outward scrutiny. The former occurs in the case of the Bank through a closed rather than transparent managerial structure. In the early decades of its operation, little was known about the Bank's opinions and activities (Hayter 1971: 21) . Even the executive directors (EDs) of the Board of the Bank were not particularly well informed of its operations. They were denied access to all documents classified "internal", and while this situation has changed more recently, EDs are sometimes required to sign confidentiality agreements before being provided with documents (Caufield 1996: 237-238) . As a former US director says, "The overriding principle is that the management is in charge of the Bank and they should only provide the directors with the information they feel the directors need" (Patrick Coady quoted in Caufield 1996: 238) .
This limitation of inward visibility may be partly attributed to the political environment which saw the emergence of the Bank, its Articles of Agreement, a dominance of economism and managerialism and so on. However, the resulting operation of power cannot be attributed to design as the Bank did not spring up ready-formed as a "powerful" institution. Rather, the operation of power partly emerges through a mixture of chance and the negotiations of a range of forces and actors. Following the Bretton Woods meeting of 1944 where Articles of Agreement were drafted for the Bank and IMF, support for the new organizations was not widespread, and it was only after a substantial public relations campaign in the US that they formally come into being on 27 December 1945 (Caufield 1996: 43-45 ). The Bank also had difficulty attracting presidents to head the organization and there was a widespread perception that it would be unsuccessful (1996: 49-50) . Following an initial period of turmoil and the resignation of the Bank's first president after only six months in the position, the situation stabilized with the appointment of John McCloy as president in 1947 McCloy as president in (1996 .
Key to McCloy's appointment and the future operation of the Bank was the negotiation of the terms of his acceptance of the position. McCloy managed to negotiate a high level of autonomy from the Board, which saw the Bank become a management-driven institution rather than one accountable to the executive directors who reported to member countries (Rich 1994: 67; Caufield 1996: 52) .
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The intensification of outward visibility occurs through attempts to know and manage the countries, economies, projects and programs that the Bank becomes involved with, and through the control of the flow of information obtained in these processes. The Bank renders
Third World nation-states visible though processes of surveillance, evaluation and judgement carried out by personnel and consultants during Bank missions and consultancies. Such analyses are typically focused upon either evaluating specific project proposals or determining a country's general creditworthiness by considering the regulatory and economic environment provided by government (Hayter 1971: 65, 51) . These are exercises in examination which mobilize the relations of power and knowledge of developmentalist social science to observe hierarchically and judge against the developmentalist norm embodied by the Bank. The results of such examinations, in the form of Bank reports on particular projects or countries, are typically restricted to the government of the country concerned, the Board of the Bank and a few select individuals (Hayter 1971:21; Caufield 1996:29) . Jonathan Cahn (1993) outlines the tight control of these and other documents produced by the Bank. Some highly classified documents, including those generated in the lending cycle, do not circulate within (or outside) the Bank. Documents arising out of final review and approval stages of a loan are made available to the Bank president, to Executive Directors and hence member countries. United States corporations and citizens are able to access these documents through a reading room once the loan is approved, and they may be provided to Non-Government
Organisations at the Bank's discretion. However, at no point do Third World country citizens have access to the documents. In short, the Third World is rendered visible and the Bank maintains control over information flows while remaining protected from scrutiny 14 .
Through this process of inward limitation and outward intensification of visibility, the Bank emerges an intensely dense node of force relations in the development dispositif. This density is enabling for, and is mutually reinforced by, a range of other activities such as education and training through the Economic Development Institute and the initiation and leadership of consortia and consultative groups of other lenders, donors and agencies. However, this does not amount to the Bank "holding" power over Third World nations and subjects but rather is premised on the circulation and promotion of the desire for development throughout the development dispositif. The central position of the Bank cannot be isolated from nationstates, with which it liaises directly, and in turn with national development planning and programs which in turn gain their justification in individual projects and programs. The
World Bank is only able to exercise power within the context of the development dispositif, and only because lines of force flow through it at a high level of density. As Foucault argues, while the pyramidal organisation of relations of power gives a dispositif a "head", 'it is the apparatus as a whole that produces "power"' (Foucault 1979: 177) . Without the continual reproduction of the desire for development within human subjects on a widespread scale in the dispositif, this power could not function. Although it seems permanent, such power rests upon accumulating chains of force relations which flow through the development dispositif not only from top to bottom, but also from the bottom up and throughout the apparatus.
Accusations that the Bank is "imperialist" mute this dimension and undermine the analysis of the operation of power. They also invite the Bank to respond by stating that it does not have the power to force their members to adopt particular policies or follow particular courses of 22 action (see Driscoll 1998; World Bank 1999) . As I have shown though, the absence of overt "force" does not mean that an operation of power is not occurring. Rather, the type of power which operates through development cannot be readily elucidated through the sovereign conceptualisation as this is more appropriate to the colonial era. 
Conclusion
Addressing post-development's shortcomings without dismissing its sensibility is productive for improving our understanding and analysis of development. Using Foucault's heuristic distinction between sovereign power and biopower to understand differences in the operation of power between colonial and development eras highlights a number of problems in the post-development approach. The reliance on the colonial metaphor and a sovereign conceptualisation of power leads some post-development writers to overly aggregate the operation of power, to ascribe intentionality to a singular historical force such as "the Americans", and to take an untenable oppositional stance. The engagement with Foucault shows that the generation of overall effects through development need not be reduced to such simplistic terms. Instead, Foucault's notions of the dispositif and normalization allow us to understand how development can have the effect of directing people's lives in a particular way without totalizing the forces relations involved. Moreover, the recognition of the productive quality of relations of power which operate through development suggests that a more tenable, productive, and perhaps more radical line of inquiry than that pursued so far by post-development is to explore the ways development and the operation of power are bound.
Thus while in some need of rescuing, post-development should not be dismissed because it lacks a program for development, and nor should it be limited to helping us understand why many development efforts fail. Drawing more closely on Foucault, something able to be attempted only in a limited way in this paper, is one way in which the post-development sensibility can be taken seriously. Foucault is one of the theoretical departure points for postdevelopment and it is likely that equally or more productive paths can be found elsewhere, particularly in the engagement with Indigenous and marginalized knowledges. If such options are to be usefully pursued, it will be necessary treat post-development's more simplistic and oppositional claims with skepticism. Equally though, we should not prematurely dismiss or unduly limit the potential of post-development.
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24 normalization features but this needs to be developed further, and it can be improved by locating it within the framework of dispositif.
9 Development encounters are characterized by a 'dynamic of recognition and disavowal of difference' (Escobar 1997: 497) in which Third World subjects are recognized as different but, through the processes of development, are incited to become "Westernized". 10 Foucault's shifting use of terms in his analysis of relations of power can be confusing. For this reason I adopt a typology in part drawn from Nikolas Rose (1996: 26) . I use technology to refer to "any assembly structured by a practical rationality with a more or less conscious goal " (1996a:26) , and technique to refer to a specific practice, ritual or device within a technology. In addition I use modality to refer to the overall characteristics of an operation of power. Each of these terms describes part or all of the functioning of power and hence they can all be used to analyze power as it operates through a given dispositif.
11 I discuss this in more detail elsewhere (Brigg 2000) , and there are many part-contributions to this thesis in existing post-development literature. For the relationship of the social sciences to development, see Cooper and Packard (1997b) .
12 At other points Escobar states that development should be 'seen as a "strategy without strategists" in the sense that nobody is explicitly masterminding it ' (1995: 232, n26) . 13 The following does not claim to be an analysis of the operation of power through the World Bank but rather aims to indicate the possibilities for an alternative understanding to that currently on offer.
14 This is obviously the general situation and does not preclude "shocks" to the Bank's modus operandi such as the Morse report on the Narmada river dam in 1992 (see Caufield 1996: 25-28) .
